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Making Consensus Tractable
Elchanan Mossel∗and Omer Tamuz†
October 8, 2013
Abstract
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents
has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and
independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some indication as to which action is optimal.
To come to a common decision, the participants perform repeated rounds of voting. In each
round, each agent casts a vote in favor of one of the two courses of action, reflecting his or her
current belief, and observes the votes of the rest.
We provide an efficient algorithm for the calculation the agents have to perform, and show
that consensus is always reached and that the probability of reaching a wrong decision decays
exponentially with the number of agents.
1 Introduction
Consensus voting, or decision by unanimous agreement, is a method of communal governance that
requires all members of a group to agree on a chosen course of action. The European Union’s Treaty
of Lisbon [6] decrees that “Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European
Council shall be taken by consensus.” In this the EU follows the historical example of the Diet of
the Hanseatic League [14] and others.
Proponents of this method consider it to have many advantages over majority voting: it culti-
vates discussion, participation and responsibility, and avoids the so-called “tyranny of the major-
ity”. The drawback is, of course, a lengthy and difficult decision making process, lacking even the
guarantee of a conclusive ending.
However, in standard theoretical setups of rational Bayesian participants (e.g. [13], [7]), agents
cannot “agree to disagree” [2], and consensus is eventually reached. Unfortunately, this may come at
the price of tractability; Bayesian calculations can, in some situations, be practically impossible [7].
Indeed, modeling economic behavior involves an inherent conflict between rationality and tractabil-
ity [20]. It seems that in many situations it is practically impossible to calculate which course of
action is optimal, leaving the theoretician with a model that is either not rational, and thus hard
to justify, or not tractable and hence not realistic. A common course of action is to relax the ra-
tionality assumption and consider boundedly-rational agents. We do not do this, but rather show
that a fully rational model is, perhaps unexpectedly, tractable.
∗UC Berkeley and Weizmann Institute of Science. Supported by a Sloan fellowship in Mathematics, by BSF grant
2004105, by NSF Career Award (DMS 054829) by ONR award N00014-07-1-0506 and by ISF grant 1300/08.
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We consider a model describing a group of Bayesian agents that have to make a binary decision.
We show that under the dynamics we describe, unanimity is reached with probability one, and give
an efficient algorithm for the agents’ calculations.
Our model features a finite group of Bayesian agents that have to choose between two possible
courses of action. Each initially receives a private and independent signal, which contains some
information indicating which action is more likely to be the correct one. The agents participate in
rounds of voting, in which each indicates which action it believes is more likely to be correct, and
learns the others’ opinion thereof. The process continues until unanimity is reached. The Bayesian
agents are myopic, so their actions are not strategic, but truthfully reflect the information available
to them. They are rational and do not follow heuristics, or rules of thumb, or boundedly-rational
courses of action.
As an example, consider a committee that has to decide whether or not to accept a candidate
for a position, who a-priori has a chance of one half to be a good hire. Each committee member gets
to interview the candidate in private. If the candidate is good - i.e., the correct action is “hire”,
then each committee member i receives a private signal Wi drawn independently from N(1, 1), the
normal distribution with expectation 1 and variance 1. If the candidate is bad (i.e., the correct
action is “don’t hire”), then Wi is drawn from N(−1, 1).
The committee now commences to vote in rounds. In each round of voting each member casts
a public “hire” or “don’t hire” vote, depending on which it thinks is more likely to be the correct
decision. At each iteration, each member’s opinion is based on its private signal, as well as the
votes of the other members in the previous rounds.
The agents are Bayesian in the sense that their beliefs are precisely calculated according to
Bayes’ Law. This is not a straightforward calculation, as they have to take into account that each
of the votes of their peers was also likewise calculated. From the description of the process it is not
at all clear that there is a succinct description of the decision process taken by the agents, and how
can this process be analyzed (indeed - we challenge the reader to try!).
In slightly more general settings the problem seems even more difficult: for example, consider
the case that the agents lie on a social network graph, i.e., when each agent only observes the
actions of only a subset of the rest. There, no efficient algorithms for the agents’ calculations are
known, and it is in fact conjectured that none exist (cf., Kanoria and Tamuz [10]). When more than
two possible actions are available, then too it seems that the computational problem is significantly
more difficult, although perhaps not intractable. An interesting open problem is to suggest an
efficient algorithm for the agents’ calculation in these (more general) models.
For our model we show that there does exist an efficient algorithm to perform the agents’
calculations. We also show that the agents will eventually all cast the same vote, and that the
probability that this vote is correct approaches one as the number of agents increases.
1.1 Related work
In 1785 the Marquis de Condorect proved a founding result [5] in the field of group decision making.
The Condorect Jury Theorem states that given that each member of a jury knows the correct verdict
with some probability p > 1/2, the probability that the jury reaches a correct decision by a majority
vote goes to ones as the size of the jury increases. Our “asymptotic learning” result extends this
theorem to a more general class of private signals, given that at least two rounds of voting are
carried out.
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Sebenius and Geanakoplos [19] show in a classical paper that a pair of agents eventually reach
agreement on the “state of with world” in a model similar to ours, with finite probability spaces.
Likewise, a consequence of the convergence proof given by Gale and Kariv [7]1 as well as Rosenberg,
Solan and Vieille [18] and Mueller-Frank [17] (three models which are generalizations of ours) is
that if a pair of agents’ actions converge, it is to the same action, unless the agents are indifferent
at the limit. However, none of these results imply that the agents’ actions do in fact converge, or
that the agents reach agreement.
We provide a basic proof of a stronger result, namely that all the agents’ actions converge,
and in particular to the same action. We further show that each round of voting increases the
probability that a given agent votes for the better alternative, and that this probability goes to
one at the second round of voting, as the number of participants goes to infinity. Finally, our most
significant improvement over the work of Gale and Kariv is that we provide the participants with
an efficient algorithm to calculate their beliefs.
The question of complexity of agreement was discussed from a somewhat different perspective in
an interesting paper by Aaronson [1]. Aaronson discusses the complexity of agreement in a revealed
beliefs model (where agents reveal their beliefs rather than just observe actions), but with general
correlated signals. He provides polynomial bounds for approximate convergence (in the sense that
the beliefs are close at a specific time t, but with no guarantee on how close they are at later times)
and designs even more efficient algorithms for achieving agreement. Of course, in the context of the
current paper, if the agents reveal their beliefs, then consensus is achieved in one round. While our
paper is much more restricted in terms of the graph (the complete graph) and the signal structure
(conditional independence) it considers a natural action dynamics, as opposed to Aaronson’s belief
dynamics or artificial dynamics. Our results are also stated in terms of convergence of beliefs and
not just closeness of beliefs at a certain point in time.
In a subsequent work to this paper, together with Allan Sly [15], we show that for very general
voting models asymptotic learning holds in the sense that as the number of voters goes to infinity
the probability of convergence to the correct outcome goes to one. However, the results of this
article are not known to extend to the general models studied in [15]. There, no efficient update
algorithms are known, no rates of convergence are known, and it is not known whether agents
always reach consensus. We answer all of these question for the model we study.
Note that the results of [15] do imply that as the number of agents goes to infinity, the probability
of non-convergence (or convergence to the wrong state) goes to zero. However, as in the work of
Gale and Kariv, for finite graphs it remains possible that with positive probability both actions are
taken infinitely often, with beliefs converging to values implying indifference between the actions.
We show that this is not the case in our model.
Studies in committee mechanism design (cf. [12, 9]) strive to construct mechanisms for eliciting
information out of committee members to arrive at optimal results. We, by and large, do not take
this path but consider a “natural” setting which was not specifically constructed to achieve any
such goal.
One could indeed raise the objection that the process could be made simpler if the committee
members were to tell each other their private signals, in which case the optimal answer would be
arrived at immediately. However, a common assumption in the study of Bayesian agents (cf. [3, 4,
21, 7]) is that “actions speak louder than words”, so that agents learn from each other’s actions
rather than revealing to each other all their information. The latter option may not be feasible,
1See a comment on this paper in [16].
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as the said information may consist of experiences and impressions that could take too long to
explain, may be difficult to articulate, or may not be even consciously known. In our case the
agents’ actions are the casting of votes.
Our work is more closely related to models of herd behavior (cf. [3, 4, 21]). These feature a
group of agents with a state of the world and corresponding private signals, much like ours. There
too agents don’t observe each others’ private signals but only actions. However, there the agents
are exogenously ordered, and each takes a single action after seeing - and learning from - the actions
of its predecessors.
1.2 Model
Our model features a finite set of agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} that have to make a binary decision
regarding an unknown state of the world S ∈ {0, 1}. Each is initially given a private signal Wi,
distributed µ0 if S = 0 and µ1 if S = 1, and independent of the other signals, conditioned on S.
Definition 1.1. Let µ0 and µ1 be measures on a σ-algebra (Ω,O) satisfying the following conditions:
1. µ0 and µ1 are mutually absolutely continuous, so that, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, the
Radon-Nikodym derivative dµ1
dµ0
(ω) exists and is non-zero for all ω ∈ Ω.
2. Let W be distributed 12µ0 +
1
2µ1, and let X = log
dµ1
dµ0
(W ). Then the distribution of X is
non-atomic.
Note that (2) implies that µ0 6= µ1, since otherwise X = 0 a.s. and thus its distribution is
atomic.
Definition 1.2. Let µ0 and µ1 be measures on a σ-algebra (Ω,O) satisfying the conditions of
definition 1.1. Let δ0, δ1 denote the measures on {0, 1} that satisfy δ0(0) = δ1(1) = 1 and δ0(1) =
δ1(0) = 0.
Let P be the probability measure over the space {0, 1} × Ωn given by
P = 12δ0 ⊗ µ0
⊗n + 12δ1 ⊗ µ1
⊗n. (1)
Let S, taking values in {0, 1}, and (W1, . . . ,Wn), taking values in Ω
n, be random variables with
joint distribution P:
(S,W1, . . . ,Wn) ∼ P.
We call S the state of the world and call Wi agent i’s private signal.
Equivalently, S is picked uniformly from {0, 1}, and conditioned on S, the agents’ private signals
Wi are distributed i.i.d. µS. It is important to note that conditioned on S the private signals Wi
are independent. In much of what follows it is not necessary to assume that they are identical, but
we make this assumption to simplify notation and conform to a widely studied economic model.
The agents participate in a process of voting rounds. In each round t each agent i casts a
public vote Vi(t) ∈ {0, 1}, depending which of the two is more likely to be the state of the world,
conditioned on the information available to i; this includes Wi as well as the votes of the other
agents in the previous rounds.
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Definition 1.3. For t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and agent i ∈ [n], let Vi(t), the vote of agent i at time t, be
defined by
Vi(t) =
{
1 if P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] > 1/2
0 otherwise
(2)
where V¯ t = {Vj(t
′) : j ∈ [n], t′ ≤ t} denotes the votes of all agents up to time t.
Alternatively, one could define
Vi(t) = argmax
s∈{0,1}
P
[
S = s
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] , (3)
with a “tie breaking law” specifying that when the conditional probability on the r.h.s. is half
then the vote is 0. We note that it is easy to see that the assumption that the distribution of the
Radon-Nikodym derivatives dµ1
dµ0
(Wi) is non-atomic (definition 1.1) implies that the probability of
ever encountering a tie is 0 a.s. and therefore the details of the tie breaking rule a.s. do not affect
the behavior of the process or our results.
1.3 Results
For the model defined in definitions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 we prove the following theorems.
• Unanimity: A unanimous decision is always reached. That is, with probability one all agents
vote identically at some round, and the process essentially ends.
Theorem 1.4. With probability one there exists a time Tu and a vote V ∈ {0, 1} such that
for all t ≥ Tu and agents i it holds that Vi(t) = V .
• Monotonicity: The probability that an agent votes correctly is non-decreasing with the
progression of rounds.
Theorem 1.5. For all agents i and times t > 1, it holds that
P [Vi(t) = S] ≥ P [Vi(t− 1) = S] .
• Asymptotic Learning: The probability of reaching a correct decision at the end of the
process approaches one as the number of agents increases. In fact, this already holds by the
second round of voting.
Theorem 1.6. Fix µ0 and µ1, and let n be the number of agents. Then there exist constants
C = C(µ0, µ1) and n0 = n0(µ0, µ1) such that
P [∀i : Vi(2) = S] > 1− e
−Cn
for all n > n0.
• Tractability: In order to discuss tractability we must assume that certain calculations related
to the distributions µ1 and µ0 take constant time, or alternatively that the algorithm has
access to an oracle which preforms them in constant time. Specifically, we define below
(definition 2.1) the log-likelihood ratio X = dµ1/dµ0 and its conditional distributions ν0 and
ν1, and assume that their cumulative distribution functions can be calculated in constant
time. Then we show that the agents’ computations are tractable:
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Theorem 1.7. Fix µ0 and µ1, and let n be the number of agents. Assume that X, as well as
the cumulative distribution functions of ν0 and ν1, can be calculated in constant time. Then
there exists an algorithm with running time O(nt), which, given i’s private signal Wi and the
votes V¯ t−1 = {Vj(t
′) : j ∈ [n], t′ < t}, calculates Vi(t), agent i’s vote at time t.
We in fact provide a simple algorithm that performs this calculation.
1.4 Comparison to majority voting
Apart from being computationally easier, majority voting is inferior in every one of the above senses.
In particular, it doesn’t aggregate information as well as repeated voting until consensus, and may
not have the asymptotic learning property. Consider the following example: A committee has
to decide whether or not to accept a candidate for a position. Each member of the committee
interviews the candidate and forms an opinion. Now, assume that a good candidate will make a
favorable impression nine times of out ten, whereas a bad candidate will make a favorable impression
six times out of ten (being good enough to have made it to the interview stage). In this case, with
overwhelming probability (i.e., with probability that tends to one as the size of the committee
increases), when the candidate is bad, about sixty percent of the committee members will still
have a good impression, and consequently a decision by majority will come to the wrong decision,
namely that the candidate is good.
This flaw is rectified by a second vote: after seeing the results of the first round of voting,
the committee members will realize that too few of them had a good impression, and will vote
against the bad candidate in the second round. Indeed, we prove below that asymptotic learning
is always achieved after two voting rounds. This suggests that in situations where voting until
convergence to consensus is impractical, it may be still be beneficial to have more than one round
of voting. Note that there exist other mechanisms that assure efficient aggregation of information.
For example, Gerardi and Yariv [8] show that adding a “cheap talk” deliberation phase before a
strategic majority vote can also lead to efficient aggregation2.
Another characteristic advantage of consensus voting is that the strengths of the participants’
convictions counts. Consider a situation in which each agent’s private signal is, with high proba-
bility, independent of the state of the world, but with some probability provides very convincing
evidence. While a single agent possessing the said “smoking gun” would have little impact in a
majority vote, his or her insistence in subsequent rounds would convey the weight of the evidence
to the rest of the group.
1.5 Asymptotic learning vs. optimal aggregation of information
A stronger notion than asymptotic learning is that of “optimal aggregation of information”. This
would describe the case that the vote that the agents eventually converge to is equal to the vote
that would be cast by a social planner who has access to all the agents’ private signals, i.e.,
argmaxs∈{0,1} P [S = s|W1, . . . ,Wn]. We state here without proof that this is not the case in our
model.
2Gerardi and Yariv consider strategic agents and show that adding a deliberation phase can lead to equilibria
in which information is efficiently aggregated. Essentially, the agents reveal their private signals and then all vote
identically. Their work, by its nature, does not consider computational issues.
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This question is related to that of monotonicity. Let w1, . . . , wn be such that whenWi = wi then
the agents all converge to 1, and let w′1, . . . , w
′
n be such that P [S = 1|Wi = w
′
i] ≥ P [S = 1|Wi = wi].
Is it necessarily the case that setting Wi = w
′
i would also result in agreement on 1? Perhaps sur-
prisingly, it is possible to construct examples in which this is not the case. A consequence is that this
model does not display optimal aggregation of information, since argmaxs∈{0,1} P [S = s|W1, . . . ,Wn]
is monotonic in the sense described above.
1.6 A note on uniform priors
We assume that the agents’ prior is uniform, i.e., P [S = 1] = P [S = 0] = 12 . We make this choice
to simplify our notation and make the article easier to read, although our results can be easily
extended to biased priors. For this extension an additional requirement is needed: it is not enough
that µ0 6= µ1, since it may be the case that for any value of Wi it holds that P [S = 1|Wi] >
1
2 . For
example, let the prior be such that P [S = 1] = 0.9, and let each private signals Wi equal S with
probability 0.51 and equal 1 − S with probability 0.49. Then for any value of Wi it will be the
case that Vi(1) = 1. In this case, although consensus will be reached immediately, there will be no
asymptotic learning.
Hence for general priors the requirement is that µ0, µ1 be such that P [Vi(1) = 1] > 0 and
P [Vi(1) = 0] > 0. Given this, the results above and the ideas of the proof below apply equally.
2 Proofs
Before proving our theorems we make some additional definitions. We start by defining the log-
likelihood ratio x and its conditional distributions ν0 and ν1.
Definition 2.1. Let x : R→ R be given by
x(ω) = log
dµ1
dµ0
(ω). (4)
Let ν0 be the distribution of x(A) when A ∼ µ0 and let ν1 be the distribution of x(A) when
A ∼ µ1.
Note that if (S,W ) ∼ 12δ0 ⊗ µ0 +
1
2δ1 ⊗ µ1, and X = x(W ) then
x(W ) = log
P [W |S = 1]
P [W |S = 0]
,
i.e., x(W ) is the log-likelihood ratio of S given W .
In the proofs that follow we denote
Xi = x(Wi)
agent i’s private log-likelihood ratio. The advantage of log-likelihood ratios is that they are additive
for conditionally independent signals.
In our analysis below an event that we often encounter is a < Xi ≤ b, and hence the following
definition will be useful.
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Definition 2.2. Let x : R2 → R be given by
x(a, b) = log
µ1(a < ω ≤ b)
µ0(a < ω ≤ b)
. (5)
Note that if (S,W ) ∼ 12δ0 ⊗ µ0 +
1
2δ1 ⊗ µ1, and X = x(W ) then
x(a, b) = log
P [a < X ≤ b|S = 1]
P [a < X ≤ b|S = 0]
,
i.e., x(a, b) is the log-likelihood ratio of S given that X is between a and b.
The following claim follows by application of Bayes’ law to Eq. 5. It follows from this claim
that if the cumulative distribution functions of ν0 and ν1 can be calculated in constant time then
so can x(·, ·). In what follows we will need to use the fact that x(·, ·) can be efficiently calculated.
Claim 2.3.
x(a, b) = log
ν1(X ≤ b)− ν1(X ≤ a)
ν0(X ≤ b)− ν0(X ≤ a)
. (6)
We shall also need the following easy claim in some of the proofs below. It can be stated
informally as “the log-likelihood ratio of the log-likelihood ratio is the log-likelihood ratio”.
Claim 2.4. Let µ0, µ1 be such that dµ1/dµ0 exists and is non-zero for all ω, and let
x(ω) = log
dµ1
dµ0
(ω).
Let ν0 be the distribution of x = x(W ) when W ∼ µ0, and let ν1 be the distribution of x = x(W )
when W ∼ µ1. Then dν1/dν0 exists and
x = log
dν1
dν0
(x). (7)
Proof. Since µ1 and µ0 are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, it follows from the
fact that x(W ) is a function of W that ν1 and ν0 are also absolutely continuous with respect to
each other, and so dν1/dν0 exists and is non-zero.
Let (S,W ) ∼ 12δ0 ⊗ µ0 +
1
2δ1 ⊗ µ1, and denote X = x(A). Let
M = P [S = 1|W ] = E [S|W ] .
Then X = log(M/(1 −M)). By the law of total expectation we have that
E [S|M ] = E [E [S|M,W ]|M ] .
Since M is a function of W then E [S|M,W ] = E [S|W ] =M and it follows that
E [S|M ] = E [M |M ] =M.
Now from the definition of X it follows that X = log(M/(1−M)) and therefore there is a one-to-one
correspondence between X and M . Hence E [S|X] = E [S|M ] =M . Therefore
log
P [S = 1|X]
P [S = 0|X]
= log
M
1−M
= X.
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But the l.h.s. of this equation is by Bayes’ law equal to
log
P [X|S = 1]
P [X|S = 0]
,
which is equal to dν1
dν0
(X), and thus we have that
X = log
dν1
dν0
(X).
2.1 Tractability
The key observation behind our tractability proof is the following. Let i and j be two agents. Since
j knows all that i knows except Wi, then even before i votes, agent j can know for which values
of Wi agent i would vote 1, and for which it would vote 0. In fact, we show below that there is a
bound (that j can calculate) such that if Xi is below that bound then i will vote 0 and otherwise
i will vote 1.
Thus at each voting round, j gains either a lower bound or an upper bound on Xi. What we in
fact show is that calculating a lower bound Ai(t) and an upper bound Bi(t), on all other agents’
private likelihood ratios Xi, is almost all that j needs to do to calculate its votes.
The following is the definition of these lower bounds Ai(t) and upper bounds Bi(t).
While Eqs. 8 and 9 may seem mysterious, in what follows we prove that these definitions indeed
correspond to the intuition provided above. To somewhat elucidate Eq. 8 (and similarly for Eq. 9)
we note that that every time agent i votes 1 the other agents learn a lower bound on Xi; the best
lower bound is the maximum of all these, and therefore we take the maximum over all the times
that i voted 1. Each of these bounds depends on the bounds that i learned on the other Xj ’s in
the previous bounds, and therefore the terms aj(v¯
t′−1) and bj(v¯
t′−1) appear there.
Definition 2.5. Let vi(t) ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [n] and t ∈ N. Similarly to definition 1.3, let v¯
t =
{vi(t
′) : i ∈ [n], t′ ≤ t} denote an element of {0, 1}nt. For i ∈ [n] and t ≥ 0, let ai : {0, 1}
nt → R
and bi : {0, 1}
nt → R be the functions recursively defined by
ai(v¯
t) = max
t′≤t s.t. vi(t′)=1

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
 . (8)
and
bi(v¯
t) = min
t′≤t s.t. vi(t′)=0

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
 . (9)
where the minimum (resp., maximum) over the empty set is taken to be infinity (resp., minus
infinity).
Let Ai(t) and Bi(t) be the random variables defined by
Ai(t) = ai(V¯
t)
and
Bi(t) = bi(V¯
t).
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Note that Ai(t) is non-decreasing and Bi(t) is non-increasing, in t.
Since, as we show below, Ai(t) and Bi(t) are lower and upper bounds on Xi at time t, we shall
need to often refer to x(Ai(t), Bi(t)), and hence denote
Xˆi(t) = x
(
Ai(t), Bi(t)
)
= x
(
ai(V¯
t), bi(V¯
t)
)
. (10)
Recall that Vi(t), agent i’s vote at time t, depends on whether or not P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] is
greater than half or not:
Vi(t) =
{
1 if P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] > 1/2
0 otherwise
Let
Yˆi(t) = log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] . (11)
Then
Vi(t) = 1 iff Yˆi(t) > 0. (12)
Theorem 2.6. For all i ∈ [n] and t > 0 it holds that
Yˆi(t) = Xi +
∑
j 6=i
Xˆj(t− 1), (13)
Proof. We prove by induction on t. The basis t = 1 follows simply from the definitions; since V¯ 0 is
empty (the agents only start voting at t = 1) then Ai(0) = −∞ and Bi(0) =∞ for all i ∈ [n], and
so
Xˆi(0) = x(Ai(0), Bi(0)) = x(−∞,∞) = 0,
by the definition of x(·, ·) (Eq. (5)). Another consequence of the fact that V¯ 0 is empty is that
Yˆi(1) = log
P [S = 1|Wi]
P [S = 0|Wi]
and so for t = 1 the statement of the theorem (Eq. (13)) reduces to
log
P [S = 1|Wi]
P [S = 0|Wi]
= Xi,
which is precisely the definition of Xi = x(Wi).
Assume the statement holds for all t′ < t and all i ∈ [n]. We will show that it holds for t and
all i. Since, as we note above, Vi(t
′) = 1 iff Yˆi(t
′) > 0, then by the inductive assumption we have
that
Vi(t
′) = 1 iff Xi +
∑
j 6=i
Xˆj(t
′ − 1) > 0 (14)
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or
Vi(t
′) = 1

−∑
j 6=i
Xˆj(t
′ − 1) < Xi


= 1

−∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(V¯
t′−1), bj(V¯
t′−1)
)
< Xi

 ,
where the second equality follows by substituting the definition of Xˆi(t
′). Hence Vi(t
′) is equivalent
to either a lower bound (if it equal to 1) or upper bound (if it is equal to 0) on Xi.
Therefore the event V¯ t
′
= v¯t
′
is equal to the event that
Xi > −
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
for all i and t′ such that vi(t
′) = 1 and
Xi ≤ −
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
for all i and t′ such that vi(t
′) = 0. Equivalently, for all i ∈ [n]:
max
t′≤t, vi(t′)=1

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
) < Xi ≤ mint′≤t, vi(t′)=0

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
Substituting the definitions of ai (Eq. (8)) and bi (Eq. (9)), this event is equal to the event
ai(v¯
t′) < Xi ≤ bi(v¯
t′), (15)
for all i ∈ [n] (note that this means that Ai(t
′) < Xi ≤ Bi(t
′) for all i and t′). Therefore
P
[
S = s
∣∣∣V¯ t′ = vt′] = P [S = s∣∣∣ai(v¯t′) < Xi ≤ bi(v¯t′) for i ∈ [n]] ,
and also
P
[
S = s
∣∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t′ = v¯t′] = P [S = s∣∣∣Wi = ω, aj(vt′) < Xj ≤ bj(v¯t′) for i 6= j] .
Hence
log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1]
= log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi = ω, aj(v¯t−1) < Xj ≤ bj(v¯t−1) for i 6= j]
P [S = 0|Wi = ω, aj(v¯t−1) < Xj ≤ bj(v¯t−1) for i 6= j]
.
Again invoking Bayes’ law, we have that
log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1]
= log

P [Wi = ω|S = 1]
P [Wi = ω|S = 0]
∏
j 6=i
P
[
aj(v¯
t−1) < Xj ≤ bj(v¯
t−1)
∣∣S = 1]
P [aj(v¯t−1) < Xj ≤ bj(v¯t−1)|S = 0]


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since the private signals are independent, conditioned on S. Substituting the definition of x(ω)
(Eq. (4)) and the definition of x(·, ·) (Eq. (5)) yields
log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi = ω, V¯ t−1 = v¯t−1] = x(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t−1), bj(v¯
t−1)
)
. (16)
Finally, since
Yˆi(t) = log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] ,
then by Eq. (16)
Yˆi(t) = x(Wi) +
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(V¯
t−1), bj(V¯
t−1)
)
,
and the theorem follows by substituting Xi = x(Wi) and Xˆj(t− 1) = x(aj(V¯
t−1), bj(V¯
t−1)).
We are now ready to prove our main theorem for this subsection.
Theorem 2.7 (Thm. 1.7). Fix µ0 and µ1, and let n be the number of agents. Assume that X, as
well as the cumulative distribution functions of ν0 and ν1, can be calculated in constant time. Then
there exists an algorithm with running time O(nt), which, given i’s private signal Wi and the votes
V¯ t−1 = {Vj(t
′) : j ∈ [n], t′ < t}, calculates Vi(t), agent i’s vote at time t.
Proof. By Eq. (12) we have that Vi(t) is a simple function of Yˆi(t). By Theorem 13 above, Yˆi(t)
can be calculated in O(n) by adding Xi (which we assume can be calculated in constant time given
Wi) to the sum over j 6= i of x(Aj(t), Bj(t)). By Eq. (6), x(a, b) can be calculated in constant time,
assuming the cumulative distribution functions of ν0 and ν1 can be calculated in constant time.
We have therefore reduced the problem to that of calculating Aj(t) = aj(V¯
t) andBj(t) = bj(V¯
t).
However, the definitions of aj and bj (Eqs. (8) and (9)) are in fact simple recursive rules for
calculating aj(v¯
t) and bj(v¯
t) for all j ∈ [n], given at−1j (v¯
t−1) and bt−1j (v¯
t−1) for all j ∈ [n]: it follows
directly from Eqs. (8) and (9) that
ai(v¯
t) =
{
max
{
ai(v¯
t−1),
∑
j 6=i x
(
aj(v¯
t−1), bj(v¯
t−1)
)}
if vi(t) = 1
ai(v¯
t−1) otherwise
,
with an analogous equation for bi(v¯
t).
Note that the sum
∑
j 6=i x
(
aj(v¯
t−1), bj(v¯
t−1)
)
needn’t be calculated from scratch for each i; one
can rather sum over all j ∈ [n] once and subtract the appropriate term for each i. Hence calculating
aj(v¯
t) and bj(v¯
t) (for all j) given their predecessors takes O(n), and the entire recursive calculation
takes O(nt).
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2.2 Unanimity
Our model is a special case of that of Gale and Kariv [7]. They show a weak agreement result:
namely, that if the votes of two agents converge, and if the agents are not indifferent at the limit
t → ∞, then they converge to the same vote. We prove the strongest possible agreement result:
consensus is reached with probability one, i.e., the agents almost always all converge to the same
vote.
Before proving the theorem we prove some standard claims. Recall the definition of x(·, ·)
(Eq. (5)):
x(a, b) = log
P [S = 1|a < X ≤ b]
P [S = 0|a < X ≤ b]
.
Claim 2.8. Let a, b be such that x(a, b) is well defined (i.e., P [a < X ≤ b|S = 0] > 0). Then
x(a, b) = logE
[
eX
∣∣a < X ≤ b, S = 0] . (17)
Proof. By Bayes’ law we have that
x(a, b) = log
P [a < X ≤ b|S = 1]
P [a < X ≤ b|S = 0]
,
Substituting the conditional distributions of X yields
x(a, b) = log
∫ b
a
dν1(x)∫ b
a
dν0(x)
.
By Claim 2.4
x = log
dν1
dν0
(x), (18)
and so we have that
x(a, b) = log
∫ b
a
dν1
dν0
(x)dν0(x)∫ b
a
dν0(x)
= log
∫ b
a
exdν0(x)∫ b
a
dν0(x)
.
Recalling that ν0 is the distribution of X conditioned on S = 0 we have that
x(a, b) = logE
[
eX
∣∣a < X ≤ b, S = 0] .
Recall that we assume that the distribution of X is non-atomic (definition 1.1). Hence the
following claim is a consequence of Eq. (17) above, by a standard argument that we omit.
Claim 2.9. x(a, b) is non-decreasing and continuous in a and in b.
The following claims follows directly from Eq. (17) above.
Claim 2.10. Let a, b be such that x(a, b) is well defined (i.e., P [a < X ≤ b|S = 0] > 0). Then
a < x(a, b) < b, assuming the distribution of X is non-atomic.
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Proof. By Eq. (17) we have that
ex(a,b) = E
[
eX
∣∣∣ea < eX ≤ eb, S = 0] ,
and so ea < ex(a,b) ≤ eb. Since we assume the distribution of X is non-atomic (definition 1.1) then
E
[
eX
∣∣∣ea < eX ≤ eb, S = 0] < eb,
and so ea < ex(a,b) < eb and the claim follows.
We now show a condition for unanimity. We will later prove that unanimity occurs w.p. 1 by
showing that this condition eventually applies, w.p. 1.
Lemma 2.11. If
∑
i
(Bi(t)−Ai(t)) <
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ (19)
then there exists a V such that Vi(t
′) = V for all i and t′ > t. I.e., unanimity is reached at time t.
Proof. We first note that, since Ai(t) is non-decreasing and Bi(t) is non-increasing then if Eq. 19
holds at time t then it also holds at all times t′ > t.
Now, recall that Xˆi(t) = x(Ai(t), Bi(t)). By Claim 2.10 we have that Ai(t) < Xˆi(t) ≤ Bi(t).
From Eq. (15) it follows that the same holds for Xi too: Ai(t) < Xi ≤ Bi(t). Hence |Xˆi(t)−Xi| ≤
Bi(t)−Ai(t) and for all i ∈ [n] we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
(
Xˆj(t)−Xj
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j
(Bj(t)−Aj(t)) . (20)
Recall that
Yˆi(t+ 1) = Xi +
∑
j 6=i
Xˆj(t),
and so
Yˆi(t+ 1)−
∑
j
Xj =
∑
j 6=i
(
Xˆj(t)−Xj
)
.
Therefore by Eq. (20) we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣Yˆi(t+ 1)−
∑
j
Xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j
(Bj(t)−Aj(t)) .
By the theorem hypothesis this implies that∣∣∣∣∣∣Yˆi(t+ 1)−
∑
j
Xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
Xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Hence Yˆi(t+ 1) and
∑
jXj have the same sign. Since Vi(t+ 1) = 1 iff Yˆi(t+ 1) > 0 (Eq. (12))
then we have shown that at time t+ 1 all agents vote identically. Since if Eq. 19 holds for time t
then it also holds for time t+ 1 then we’ve shown that for all t′ > t the agents will agree in every
round. It remains to show that they don’t all change their opinion, as a group.
Now, if the agents all vote 1 at time t + 1 then, by the definition of Ai(t) and Bi(t), it holds
that Bi(t+ 2) = Bi(t+ 1) and Ai(t+ 2) ≥ Ai(t+ 1). Since by Claim 2.9 x(a, b) is non-decreasing
in a, then we have that Xˆi(t+ 2) ≥ Xˆi(t+ 1) for all i, and so Yˆi(t+ 2) ≥ Yˆi(t+ 1) for all i. Hence
the agents will all vote 1 at time t+ 2. The same argument applies when all the agents vote 0 at
time t+ 1, and the proof follows by induction on t.
We make another definition before proceeding to prove the main theorem of this subsection.
Recall the definitions of ai, bi, Ai and Bi:
ai(v¯
t) = max
t′≤t s.t. vi(t′)=1

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)

and
bi(v¯
t) = min
t′≤t s.t. vi(t′)=0

−
∑
j 6=i
x
(
aj(v¯
t′−1), bj(v¯
t′−1)
)
 .
with Ai(t) = ai(V
t) and Bi(t) = bi(V
t). As we noted above Ai(t) is non-decreasing in t and Bi(t)
is non-increasing in t. Hence they have limits which we denote by Ai(∞) and Bi(∞). Furthermore,
if as above we denote Xˆi(t) = x
(
aj(V¯
t′), bj(V¯
t′)
)
then
Ai(∞) = sup
t′ s.t. Vi(t′)=1

−
∑
j 6=i
Xˆi(t
′)

 (21)
and
Bi(∞) = inf
t′ s.t. Vi(t′)=0

−
∑
j 6=i
Xˆi(t
′)

 (22)
Note that since Xˆi(t) = x(Ai(t), Bi(t)), and since x(a, b) is a continuous function of a and b
(Claim 2.9) then
lim
t→∞
Xˆi(t) = x
(
Ai(∞), Bi(∞)
)
. (23)
Theorem 2.12 (Thm. 1.4). With probability one there exists a time Tu and a vote V ∈ {0, 1} such
that for all t ≥ Tu and agents i it holds that Vi(t) = V .
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that unanimity is never reached, and so by Lemma 2.11 for
all t it holds that
∑
iBi(t)−Ai(t) ≥ |
∑
iXi|. Then, since Bi(t)−Ai(t) is monotonically decreasing,
it holds that
lim
t→∞
∑
i
(Bi(t)−Ai(t)) ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ . (24)
Let Z := limt→∞
∑
j Xˆj(t). We consider separately the events that Z = 0, Z < 0 and Z > 0:
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1. Z = 0
We assume (definition 1.1) that the distribution of Xi is non-atomic, and so
∑
iXi 6= 0 with
probability 1. Hence by Eq. (24) there must be some agent i for which
lim
t→∞
(Bi(t)−Ai(t)) = Bi(∞)−Ai(∞) > 0.
Assume w.l.o.g. Vi(t) = 1 infinitely many times. Hence, by Eq. (21), we have that
Ai(∞) ≥ − lim
t→∞
∑
j 6=i
Xˆi(t)
= lim
t→∞
Xˆi(t)− lim
t→∞
∑
j
Xˆj(t).
Since we assume in this case that Z = limt→∞
∑
j Xˆj(t) = 0 then we have that
Ai(∞) ≥ lim
t→∞
Xˆi(t).
But sinceAi(∞) < Bi(∞) then by Eq. (23) and Claim 2.10 we have that Ai(∞) < limt→∞ Xˆi(t),
which is a contradiction.
The intuition here is that when i votes 1 it is revealed that Xi > Xˆi(t)−
∑
j Xˆj(t). Hence if∑
j Xˆj(t) is very small then Ai(t) approaches Xˆi(t) arbitrarily closely, which is impossible if
Ai(t) is to stay well separated from Bi(t).
2. Z > 0
Since unanimity is never reached then there must be some i for which Yˆi(t) ≤ 0 infinitely
many times. Hence by Eq. (22) we have that
Bi(∞) ≤ − lim
t→∞
∑
j 6=i
Xˆi(t)
= lim
t→∞
Xˆi(t)− lim
t→∞
∑
j
Xˆj(t).
Since by assumption limt→∞
∑
j Xˆj(t) > 0 then we have that
Bi(∞) < lim
t→∞
Xˆi(t).
However by Eq. (23) and Claim 2.10 we have that Bi(∞) > limt→∞ Xˆi(t), which is a contra-
diction.
In this case the intuition is that when i votes 0 even though
∑
j Xˆj(t) is positive, then Bi
decreases by at least
∑
j Xˆj(t), which cannot continue indefinitely when limt→∞
∑
j Xˆj(t) > 0.
3. Z < 0
The argument here is identical to that of the previous case.
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2.3 Monotonicity
Since the agents base their decisions on a growing information base, their decisions become more
and more likely to be correct. We prove this formally below, using a standard argument.
Theorem 2.13 (Thm. 1.5). For all agents i and times t > 1, it holds that
P [Vi(t) = S] ≥ P [Vi(t− 1) = S] .
Proof. As noted in Eq. (3), Vi(t) is the choice in {0, 1} that maximizes the probability of matching
the state of the world, given Wi and V¯
t−1. Let f be an arbitrary function of Wi and V¯
t−1. Then:
P
[
Vi(t) = S
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] ≥ P [f(Wi, V¯ t−1) = S∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] .
Since Vi(t− 1) is also a function of Wi and V¯
t−1 then we can substitute Vi(t− 1) for f(Wi, V¯
t−1)
in the equation above, and the theorem follows.
Note that P [Vi(t) = S] is strictly larger than P [Vi(t− 1) = S] whenever P [Vi(t) 6= Vi(t− 1)] is
positive, i.e. when the decision may change.
2.4 Asymptotic Learning
We show that with high probability after observing the first round of voting all voters know the
correct state of the world, and a unanimous and correct decision is reached at the second round of
voting. Note that by the monotonicity theorem (1.5), this means that the same holds for all rounds
after the second round.
Before proving this theorem we will prove the following claim.
Claim 2.14.
P [X < −C|S = 1] < e−C .
Proof. Recall that by Claim 2.4
x =
dν1
dν0
(x)
and so ∫ ∞
−∞
dν0(X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−Xdν1(X).
But ν0 is a probability measure, and so
∫∞
−∞ dν0(X) = 1. Hence
E
[
e−X
∣∣S = 1] = ∫ ∞
−∞
e−Xdν1(X) = 1.
Therefore by the Markov bound
P [X < −C|S = 1] = P
[
e−X > eC
∣∣S = 1] < e−C .
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We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this subsection.
Theorem 2.15 (Thm. 1.6). Fix µ0 and µ1, and let n be the number of agents. Then there exist
constants C = C(µ0, µ1) and n0 = n0(µ0, µ1) such that
P [∀i : Vi(2) = S] > 1− e
−Cn
for all n > n0.
Proof. We shall show that there exists a constant C = C(µ0, µ1) such that
P [∀i : Vi(2) = 1|S = 1] > 1− e
−Cn
for all n large enough. Since the same argument can be used to show an analogous statement for
S = 0 then this will prove the theorem.
Recall that Vi(t) is the indicator of the event Yˆi(t) > 0, where
Yˆi(t) = log
P
[
S = 1
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1]
P
[
S = 0
∣∣Wi, V¯ t−1] .
Invoking Bayes’ law and the conditional independence of the private signals we get that
Yˆi(2) = log

P [Wi|S = 1]
P [Wi|S = 0]
∏
j 6=i
P [Vj(1)|S = 1]
P [Vj(1)|S = 0]


Denote by Ni the number of agents other than i who vote 1 in the first round:
Ni = |{j s.t. Vj(1) = 1, j 6= i}|.
Then since Xi = log
P[Wi|S=1]
P[Wi|S=0]
then we can write
Yˆi(2) = Xi +Ni log
P [X > 0|S = 1]
P [X > 0|S = 0]
+ (n− 1−Ni) log
P [X ≤ 0|S = 1]
P [X ≤ 0|S = 0]
.
Denote
α1 = P [X > 0|S = 1] and α0 = P [X > 0|S = 0] ,
and note that x(0,∞) > 0 by Claim 2.10, and so since x(0,∞) = logα1/α0 then α1 6= α0. We can
now write
Yˆi(2) = Xi +Ni log
α1
α0
+ (n− 1−Ni) log
1− α1
1− α0
.
Denote
Wi = Ni log
α1
α0
+ (n − 1−Ni) log
1− α1
1− α0
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so that Yˆi(2) = Xi+Wi. Since E [Ni|S = 1] = (n− 1)α1 then the conditioning Wi on S = 1 we get
that
E [Wi|S = 1] = (n − 1)α1 log
α1
α0
+ (n− 1)(1 − α1) log
1− α1
1− α0
.
If we denote (n−1)D = E [Wi|S = 1] thenD is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [11] of two Bernoulli
distributions with expectations α1 6= α0. Hence D > 0.
Now, conditioned on S the private signals are independent, and hence so are the votes at round
1, since Vi(1) depends onWi only. ThereforeWi, conditioned on S = 1, is the sum of n−1 bounded
independent random variables. Therefore by the Hoeffding bound there exists a constant C1 such
that
P
[
Wi ≤
1
2(n − 1)D
∣∣S = 1] ≤ e−C1(n−1). (25)
By Claim 2.14 we have that P
[
Xi ≤ −
1
2(n− 1)D
∣∣S = 1] < e−12D(n−1), which, together with
Eq. (25) and the union bound yields
P [Vi(2) = 0|S = 1] < e
−
1
2D(n−1) + e−C1(n−1).
Therefore, again using the union bound it follows that
P [∃i : Vi(2) = 0|S = 1] < n(e
−
1
2D(n−1) + e−C1(n−1)).
Finally, it follows that for n large enough there exists a constant C such that
P [∀i : Vi(2) = 1|S = 1] > 1− e
−Cn.
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